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Abstract. Computer security has traditionally been assessed from a technical point of view. One 
other view is about the role played by legitimate users of systems in impairing the level of 
protection. In order to address this issue, we wish to adopt a multidisciplinary standpoint and 
investigate some of the human aspects involved in computer security. From research in 
psychology, it is known that people make biased decisions. They sometimes overlook rules in 
order to gain maximum benefits for the cost of a given action. This situation leads to insidious 
security lapses whereby the level of protection is traded-off against usability. In this paper, we 
highlight the cognitive processes underlying such security impairments. At the end of the paper, 
we propose a short usability-centered set of recommendations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Our society is becoming more and more dependent on computer systems, which nowadays are 
used in everyday life, from business to banking, from entertainment to healthcare. Most of these 
systems are interconnected through the internet, which inherently is very open and vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks. Attacks on these systems cause a wide variety of disruptions, ranging from losses in 
service to financial or safety consequences. The threats that these attacks constitute over the 
mere use and survival of IT systems have led to wide quantitative surveys (e.g. [20, 24]).  
 
Because a single attack can freeze an entire sector within hours, securing computer systems has 
become a very important part of system design, development and deployment. However, the 
measures implemented are not always as efficient as required. More research and better tools are 
therefore needed in order to understand, block and anticipate security threats. A novelty may be 
the growing acknowledgement from the research community that technical solutions alone are 
not enough any more. Historically, security has been very often addressed from the attackers’ 
side. From this angle, the emphasis has classically been on the motivations and means used to 
break into systems [22, 32, 38, 42, 56]. However productive this research area has been and still 
is, it tends to blur the exact role of the legitimate users (e.g. end-users, security officers, managers, 
designers) who are also actively involved in computer security impairments. It seems to the 
authors that this other angle is worth exploring as well. Moreover, as part of the DIRC1 research, 
1 DIRC (Dependability: an Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration) is a UK-based interdisciplinary research project 
on the dependability of computer-based systems. Visit DIRC at http://www.dirc.org.uk. 
we are interested in interdisciplinary aspects of computing. For these reasons, some aspects of 
the role played by legitimate users with regard to security are addressed in this paper. 
 
Computer security is an area that cognitive scientists have not investigated as deeply as human-
computer interaction or problem solving. It nonetheless offers an interesting aspect in the sense 
that there are conflicting objectives held by some of the actors of a single system, namely 
attackers and legitimate users. It follows that depending on the goal that an actor is pursuing 
(attack or legal use), the use of a given computer system will differ dramatically. Whereas the 
roles of attackers are pretty clear (e.g. intrusion, denial of service), those of legitimate users 
regarding security are more subtle. Stemming from this assumption, we will examine some of the 
latter’s practices and shed some light on the mental processes involved. We will try to assess the 
extent to which computer security can be interpreted in terms of an intuitive cost-benefit trade-
off. 
 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. The next section (section 2) provides some 
background about trade-offs in the workplace. We then investigate the cognitive aspects of trade-
offs (section 3) and expose some examples of insecure computing practices (section 4). The 
paper then discusses risk issues, the antagonism among some of the security actors, as well as 
organisational policies (section 5). This is followed by a set of recommendations (section 6), 
bearing in mind some limitations (section 7). The article concludes with some brief reflections on 
the status of computing in modern society. 
2. TRADE-OFFS IN THE WILD 
Since Simon [55] and his concept of bounded rationality, it is accepted that human actions do not 
reach perfection but instead seek an acceptable level of performance with respect to their goals 
and what the cognitive resources allow. The fact that the cognitive system never aims at handling 
all the data available in the environment is a central aspect of the cognitive resources saving 
strategy. As a consequence, cognitive acts are an intuitive and implicit trade-off which balances 
cost and efficiency [10, 57]. This strategy is put in place for the majority of human actions and 
therefore applies to an extremely wide class of situations, e.g. troubleshooting [13], medical 
prescriptions [25], control of dynamic situations [7]. Just like in other activities, trade-offs 
introduce a risk (see for instance [36]) by not taking into account some possible consequences 
deriving from the decided actions. In the case of IT security, trade-offs and risk can thus 
combine themselves and implement a threat. Therefore, our purpose will be to assess the 
relevance of trade-off mechanisms regarding security impairments. 
Before we consider computer security, it can be useful to have a look at a field example. 
Although the latter is quite remote from computing, we think it puts things clearly and shows 
how the parameters of a trade-off are handled by humans. 
 
On December 30, 1999, in Tokaimura (Japan), an accident occurred at the JCO nuclear fuel 
processing plant, causing the death of two workers (see [29]). The immediate cause of the 
accident was the pouring of approximately 15kg of uranium into a precipitation tank. Since there 
is a limited amount of uranium that can be put together without initiating fission, this procedure 
required mass and volume control. As the critical mass was exceeded, a chain reaction occurred, 
generating lethal radiations. The workers’ task was to process seven batches of uranium in order 
to produce a uranium solution. The tank required to process this solution is called a buffer column. 
At JCO, its dimensions were 17.5 cm in diameter and 2.2 m in depth, a geometry permitting a 
better control of fission reactions. The inside of this tank was known to be difficult to clean. In 
addition, it was positioned only 10 cm above the floor, making it difficult to collect the uranium 
solution from the bottom of the column. Thus, workers illegally opted for using another (larger) 
tank called precipitation tank. Due to its dimensions, this latter tank was not geometrically safe but 
it was positioned 1 m above the floor. Moreover, it was equipped with a stir propeller making it 
easier to use for homogenising the uranium solution. The pouring of the 15kg of uranium at once 
triggered the criticality accident. Its causes were rooted in a complex combination of deviant 
organisational practices. Among these, pressures from the managerial team to increase the 
production without enough regard to safety implications and lack of crew training played a 
significant role. 
In hindsight, we speculate that the operators have traded-off productivity and practicality against 
risk. As their knowledge about critical uranium masses was poor, they were unaware that they 
were crossing a safety boundary. This case is an instance of how trade-offs can go wrong. With 
this example, we want to highlight the workarounds that operators often implement in order to 
perform daily actions in a less constrained manner (see [30]). These workarounds can be put in 
place in a wild way, and depending on the level of knowledge and perceived risk, getting the work 
done sometimes overrides security concerns. Also, we wish to highlight the role of the managerial 
team at JCO who played an active goal in the triggering of the accident [29]. This latter point is of 
relevance to our paper and will be addressed later. 
 
Following a cognitive approach, we believe that virtually every decision is a matter of trade-off. 
Humans do not try to produce perfect responses to the environment. Instead, they tend to accept 
good enough solutions. We think that this conception of human cognitive activities applies in 
computer security, for both attackers and legitimate users. The former attempt to design effective 
worms or denials of service, for instance. The latter, in turn, try to protect themselves as 
effectively as possible. But in both cases, there are not infinite amounts of resources (e.g. time, 
money or effort) to allocate to attacking or protecting. This is where human flexibility comes into 
play: people perform intuitive trade-offs between (some form of) cost and (some form of) 
benefits. We will consider some concrete computer examples after having briefly explained how 
the concept of trade-off translates in security. 
3. TRADE-OFFS FROM A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 
To better illustrate how we use the concept of trade-off, we represent it graphically in Figure 1. 
The dark area at the lower right-hand corner represents the maximum efficiency where one 
reaches high benefits for low costs. The top left-hand corner, on the contrary, represents a poor 
efficiency where one spends a lot to gain little. Between these two extremities, there is clearly an 
entire continuum. The theoretical trade-off line represents a frontier between costs and benefits. 
Any activity above this line will cost more than it rewards. Conversely, any activity below this line 
will reward more than it costs. 
Having said this, humans do not always obey logic but seek cheap actions with maximum 
expected benefits. Therefore, the least-effort trade-off line may be a more realistic one. This view 
is derived from a least effort rule whereby humans attempt to reach an acceptable level of 
performance with the minimal mental effort [11]. As a consequence, decision making can become 
a biased benefits-driven process. When applied to a security-usability trade-off, usability may 
come first, hence turning security into a side-issue. This will be further discussed in section 5.2. 
 
Let us now apply the graph to the simple example of a user considering adding a button to a 
toolbar in order to access a function more quickly. If the button is going to be used only one 
time, the time cost of adding it may be higher than the expected time saved during the task. 
Therefore, it is likely that the button will not be added. On the other hand, if this function is to 
be used repeatedly, the expected benefits may be worth the time spent in configuring the system. 
With this simple example, we wish to recall that humans intuitively, though implicitly, evaluate 
the efficiency of their decisions before they implement them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of a costs/benefits trade-off. 
 
There are cases where human actions are given explicit limits: decisions can be benefit-driven or 
cost-driven (see Figure 2). In the first case, a course of actions is interrupted when some 
objective is met. In the other case, the target is set in terms of cost (money, time, etc.) and actions 
will stop when the limit is reached. In both cases, the course of actions never follows the straight 
trade-off line. Instead, we believe it fluctuates with time depending on the given phases of the 
work. For instance, one may be prepared to temporarily carry out a costly action if high benefits 
are expected from it later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Graphical representations of benefits-driven (left) and costs-driven (right) strategies. 
 
Classically, attackers are said to exploit security holes left open because of a poor design and/or 
insecure practices. In other words, the malicious intentions of the attackers are, to some extent, 
facilitated by the behaviour of some legitimate users. We obviously do not put the blame on 
them. Neither do we believe that the motives that some attackers promote (e.g. learning, 
curiosity, challenge, etc.) will ever justify any sort of damage caused to someone’s data, tool or 
service. Having said that, security is a two-way issue. Merely assessing it from the attacker’s point 
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of view only captures half of the problem (see [8] for a survey on attackers’ techniques and 
motivations). The other half is about how we (legitimate users) use our computers. 
4. SECURITY TRADE-OFFS BY LEGITIMATE USERS 
From our cognitive standpoint, administrators as well as end-users consider their actions from an 
economic point of view and trade-off security against usability. This practice, as highlighted in the 
following sub-sections, introduces threats in systems that attackers exploit. It is not the case that 
attacks can be easily eliminated, but understanding where trade-offs lie may allow system 
designers to think more about the interest of making security products and policies compatible 
with some intuitive notion of usability. This is not only an issue about “comfort of use” but, as 
we will see in the following sub-sections, is a problem that directly impacts security. 
4.1.1. Passwords: a memory issue 
Although new approaches towards authentication have been proposed [15, 17, 39], passwords 
still remain a widespread security mechanism. A number of modern software products still tend 
to force passwords of minimum eight characters long. This tendency probably originates from a 
desire to control accesses more tightly with the hidden assumption that it will increase privacy of 
data. Although they are harder to crack, long passwords are not totally secure [46]. When one 
actually looks at what happens at the workplace, human cognitive limitations become obvious: 
users cannot remember their passwords and need external memories (e.g. sticky notes on 
monitors). The use of passwords raises several usability problems [6]. Security faces a nice 
paradox where by increasing the complexity and number of passwords, the level of protection 
could actually decrease [59].  
User login and passwords to computer accounts are used very often and are the main method to 
get access to systems. In this case, frequency compensates for complexity: the password is used 
often enough to be remembered [54]. But how many counter-examples are there where people 
have to write down passwords? To cope with this problem, some systems (most notably e-
commerce web sites) offer to remember them. Again, for the sake of usability, a user may be 
tempted to use such storage features (cookies). It is a useful feature but it comes down to the 
user’s judgement as to whether a service or a piece of data is trivial enough so that its password 
can be stored on a computer. Another drawback is that users may not remember their password 
if somehow the cookies are emptied (e.g. when the system is rebuilt). 
The same kind of problem applies to BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) password. 
Administrators sometimes keep the default password, information that can then be found by 
anyone on the internet (see for instance [1]). 
4.1.2. Anti-virus software updates: a risk issue 
Anti-virus protections are useful barriers but only when they are up-to-date. They need some 
attention in this respect. But maintaining, updating and upgrading them has a cost that can 
conflict with end-user’s main task, thereby impacting security. Therefore anti-virus protections 
potentially leave a hole open, the size of which depending, among others, on the frequency of 
updates and reactivity to patches availability [51]. Hence risk, which is typically perceived 
inaccurately by humans [50], comes into the equation at this level. End-users or security officers 
have to accept a certain level of (perceived) vulnerability regarding their system. Automatic 
updates have been felt to tackle this problem by lowering the likelihood of holes in the anti-virus 
protection. It seems to be a reasonable belief and is indeed a widespread feature. Unfortunately, 
the update process can be corrupted by an attacker. Although this is not a trivial task, it has been 
reported that centralised distribution of software could be tampered [2, 31]. This puts high 
threats on IT systems since it can offer an attacker to automate the installation of backdoors or 
the downloading of harmful contents on the end-user’s machine. For this reason, automatic 
updates are not a panacea. Despite this negative state of facts, large organisations use this feature 
extensively. They may assume quite reasonably that the gain in usability and the regularity of 
updates together will provide benefits that are felt to overweigh risk.  
4.1.3. Email attachments: a trust issue 
Email attachments have been used very widely for spreading malicious code [22, 63]. Typically, 
the code is added as an attachment to a seemingly benign email. When the attachment is opened, 
the code is executed on the machine, exploiting security holes in the email program. Harmful 
email attachments pose two problems. First, they very often come from trusted senders who 
were infected themselves. Thus, due to this trust relationship, the degree of suspicion regarding 
the decision to open the document is already low. Second, email attachments are used so widely 
for legitimate purposes that opening them has become as automatic as picking up the phone [9]. 
Of course, a rule such as “do not open attachments you are not expecting or from people you do not know” is 
unworkable since it generates too many false positives: many valid attachments would have to be 
left unread. Again, automation has been felt to tackle this problem: many mail servers now 
include anti-virus scanners. However, this is not the optimum solution since these scanners a) 
may not be up-to-date, b) sometimes detect false positives and c) open a discussion on whether 
or not scanning might invade privacy. 
4.1.4. Files sharing: a practicality issue 
On Windows operating systems, there is a feature that allows users to share files on their 
computer with other users. This is a very useful feature, especially for collaborative work among 
several users. It facilitates an easy and quick way to access or modify (potentially big) files from 
multiple computers. On the down side, this service (running on port 445) is vulnerable to denial 
of service attack [43] or to worms such as W32/Deloder [45].  
For everyday users, the practicality of sharing file of folders may outweigh security concerns. As 
in most cases, the threats can be minimised by applying security patches. However, the existence 
of such patches is not known to everyone. Moreover, the installation of the patch itself consumes 
work time and causes a distraction, which can be perceived altogether as factors of resistance to 
securing the system. Lastly, users may simply not be aware of the risks associated with the default 
settings in file sharing and they may “share with everyone” without knowing how broadly they 
disclose their data. 
5. DISCUSSION 
After having considered some concrete examples based on the use of computers, it seems 
necessary to adopt a broader view and address some more general issues. Among these, accepted 
losses and risks have to be mentioned as security policies are not meant to protect every single 
piece of data or service. Furthermore, threats can be discussed from the standpoint of an 
antagonism between the roles of attackers and legitimate users. The discrepancy in the motives of 
these actors is where security holes lie. Lastly, we will quickly evoke organisational issues by 
describing a multi-layered view of systems’ security. 
5.1. Accepted losses, risk perception and systems’ protection 
Although we have reasoned so far under the reductive assumption that all the data have to be 
protected, we now want to highlight a somewhat different picture according to which there exist 
some acceptable losses that humans implicitly take into account in setting up protections. The 
trade-off here involves the cost of protection and the cost of loss (see [26]). Data or services that 
can be easily replaced, disclosed or lost without serious consequences will probably have a 
relatively low level of protection. The underlying evaluation of the required level of protection is 
believed to be done in an intuitive manner most of the time. We also think it guides, to some 
extent, the security policies adopted by organisations. As each single piece of data cannot be 
equally protected, some of these data are inevitably left vulnerable to attacks. This may be a 
sensible decision if, as aforementioned, loss or disclosure of data is accepted. In this view, it 
seems important to highlight that protecting a system is an implicit dialogue between security 
officers and attackers. We believe security policies define the nature of this dialogue before the 
occurrence of any attack. To some extent, this conception goes against the widespread belief 
according to which “attackers play first”. 
 
The following point may be perceived as a side-issue in this paper but the information that is 
intentionally left unprotected can cause indirect damages. A category of attackers called social 
engineers are specialised in gathering this kind of data by the means of psychological manipulation. 
They seek contact with a legitimate insider of the target system and trick that person into 
revealing passwords or other information that compromises the target system's security. The 
attackers usually conduct their deception through the phone in order to minimise the risk of 
being caught or recognised. See [34, 35, 44] for more information on social engineering. 
The cost of losing valuable data or service may be one of the obvious drivers for designing and 
applying security protections. But benign or seemingly trivial pieces of information, although not 
directly security-critical, can be damaging as well, especially at the hand of malicious social 
engineers. 
 
IT security shares some similarities with many domains. Risk taking is one of them and its 
management can be both unavoidable and tacit (see [25] about general practitioners 
prescriptions). Let us take the following example. A car is safer when it is immobile than when 
one is driving it. But for a car to deliver its service (transporting people and goods), the driver 
and the passengers are forced to expose themselves to risks. These may be reduced down to 
some acceptable level if the driver is careful and experienced. But there will always be a number 
of factors he or she will not be able to influence (other drivers, mechanical incidents, etc.) that 
will impact the level of safety of this situation. The same argument holds with, for instance, a 
server. Not plugging it into a network is a relatively secure condition but the service will not be 
delivered. Therefore, some risk has to be accepted for virtually any piece of equipment to fulfil its 
function. 
Another problematic and risky situation is one where the benefits expected from some 
programming decision outweigh protection measures (see [49], about programming with COTS). 
Saving time and cost is common practice within the community of programmers [52] and may 
lead to biased benefits-driven decisions [18]. This applies to security in the sense that a threat can 
be identified by e.g. a software developer but found too costly to fix or thought unlikely to be 
exploited. This behaviour extends to an extremely wide range of cases. For example, in everyday’s 
life, we tend not to wear our safety belt when driving on very short distances (e.g. parking our car 
in the driveway). In this situation, we perceive risks as being very low and we implicitly adapt our 
protection level accordingly. The smaller the perceived risk, the lower the level of protection. 
However, humans are typically biased at perceiving actual levels of risk [50] and rarely have an 
exhaustive knowledge of the systems they interact with. It follows that the impact of a given 
practice over the security of a system is unlikely to be accurately assessed by an end-user. Thus 
intuitive, heuristic risk assessments, although acceptable for everyday’s life, do not always 
accurately capture the criticality of certain threats. This inaccuracy therefore degrades the 
identification and compensation of security breaches, which in the end can depend on subjective 
decisions. 
 
Last but not least, there is a human tendency to “slide on the risk slope”. Large security incidents 
or industrial accidents are not caused by a sudden change in security or safety policy. Departure 
from a reasonable level of risk does not happen in one day. It is an accumulation of a number of 
small insecure increments that progressively deteriorate the level of protection, each of which 
being seen as acceptable per se. This is a classic situation in large industrial system’s safety: large-
scale accidents are made of a concatenation of small failures [41]. 
5.2. Antagonism among security actors 
It seems plausible that attackers, just as legitimate users do, perform trade-offs in the way they 
use their own computers. They may tend to intuitively and implicitly compare the costs of their 
actions (e.g. time) to the expected benefits and then take decisions on the basis of this evaluation. 
The rule-of-thumb states that if costs are perceived as worth the expected benefits, then some 
action is likely to be performed. However, because attacker’s and legitimate users’ motivations are 
fundamentally different, we think that their respective trade-offs are different in nature. Attackers 
attack because they get a reward of some sort (self-satisfaction, peer-recognition, money, etc.). 
Legitimate users protect themselves because they need to. As far as trade-offs are concerned, 
these motives bring a consequence that attackers may care less about costs than legitimate users 
do. This discrepancy of motivations is perhaps where threats originate. 
 
In the case where they have identified a target, attackers may be more focussed on the damages 
expected from their attack than on the costs involved. On the other hand, legitimate users may 
prioritise usability with little concern about security. This is a common case of usability-driven 
behaviour. We represent this discrepancy as a gap between attackers’ and legitimate users’ trade-
off strategies (Figure 3). In our conception, this gap gives some advantage to attackers. The larger 
the gap, the most successful the attack could be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Graphical representations of two different trade-off strategies leading to a security gap. 
 
From our point of view, attackers’ trade-off involves expected damages against cost of actions 
whereas legitimate users trade-off usability against security. Having said this, it is not the case that 
an action making a system more usable will systematically degrade security. Instead, the point is 
that legitimate users, sometimes without being aware of it, prioritise usability at the detriment of 
security. In our opinion, this creates a security gap. Therefore, a successful attack can be 
described in terms of a malicious action whose degree of refinement is higher than the degree of 
protection of the target system. 
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5.3. Beyond the individual picture… 
So far, we have been concentrating on an individual perspective where cognitive factors are 
thought to play a determinant role. Beyond this picture, we want to acknowledge the collective 
dimension of security in large distributed computer-based systems. More precisely, we think that 
Reason’s model [48] (see Figure 4) adopts a useful view on organisations in the sense that they 
are described in terms of multi-layered systems. Applied to the field of security, this view can 
help describe a computer-based system as one composed of threats, actors and protection layers. 
With this model, security is described as a multi-layered process where a variety of users (e.g. 
developers, security officers, end-users…) have a role to play. Each of these users impact on 
security. Administrators and/or end-users, for instance, by not making updates for their anti-
virus software, leave holes open for attacks. This type of local failure may exist at any given layer 
of the organisation, for any role. It creates latent security breaches that, combined with each 
other, can defeat an entire system’s protections. In the context of this paper, these breaches are 
interpreted in terms of trade-offs whereby users simply wish to reach good enough solutions.  
When applied to security, Reason’s model can describe, from a system point of view, the 
impairments made to security by legitimate users and attackers. The latter attempt to propagate 
attacks through security holes in order to reach an objective such as data, a service or to cause 
disruption in the functioning of the system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Successful attacks propagate through several protection layers (adapted from [16]). 
 
How people perceive IT security [23, 27] and privacy [4, 19] is a useful approach to assess 
individual contributions or impairments to security. However, these factors have to be brought 
back into a broader picture where security breaches are caused, facilitated or maintained by the 
combination of a variety of causes rather than by mere, isolated end-users’ actions. By quoting 
Reason’s model, our intention is to highlight the combination of factors needed for an attack to 
succeed. According to the popular belief, attacks occur because some malicious people exploit 
security holes. We wish to promote a somewhat different view according to which successful 
attacks are a combination of weak protections and malicious intentions. This idea can be 
stretched even further. As we cannot eliminate attacks altogether, the most productive approach 
may be to regard attacks as the outcomes of flawed policies and/or practices. Their origins are 
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deeply rooted within early design assumptions or within managerial decisions. For instance, due 
to productivity constraints, the manager of a small company may misjudge the importance of 
protecting IT activities. This can take the form of a backlog of security actions waiting to be 
done. Such a laissez-faire policy may lead to the adoption of a poor security culture. The latter may 
propagate through the various stakeholders of the organisation, leading to e.g. unprotected data 
or weak passwords. There could obviously be an infinite number of examples that would follow 
the same pattern of a multiple, intricate set of causes (see [16] for more complete views on 
Reason’s model application to security). 
5.4. Summary 
Here are the points that we have laid out in this paper: 
• Trade-offs are sometimes implemented in a wild, uncontrolled manner. Legitimate users 
sometimes prioritise immediate benefits to the detriment of long-term security. 
• Passwords, anti-virus updates, email attachments and shared folders respectively raise 
such issues as memory limitations, risk, trust and practicality. 
• Security does not imply protecting everything since some losses are acceptable. However, 
because risk perception by humans is highly biased, valuable data could be under threats. 
• Trade-offs by legitimate users differ in nature from the ones performed by attackers. The 
resulting gap creates or maintains security breaches. 
• Computer security is an organisational matter. 
6. WHAT CAN WE DO? 
Telling people what to do about security is one option. But one lesson that can be drawn from 
violations in systems is that one should not expect humans to always act as prescribed. Within 
industrial settings, procedures themselves do not rule the human behaviour [28] and there are 
many ways in which humans can configure a system and use it in unexpected and/or unprotected 
modes, even if it implies implementing a violation [5]. This seems to be a universal pattern and to 
this respect, at least, IT security is similar to virtually any other field of activity. The motivation 
for diverging from recommended practice may be based on an intuitive cost–benefit evaluation 
where potential negative consequences of one’s act are overweighed by expected benefits. This is 
typical for passwords that are written down or passed on to colleagues. It is also true for harmful 
email attachments that happen to hit computer-aware staff in academic departments every now 
and then. Generally speaking, if the perceived risk attached to an illegal action (e.g. lending a 
password) is seen as lower than the expected benefits (e.g. gain in time), then a violation will be 
put in place. This is extremely common practice and goes well beyond computer security. In this 
trade-off, factors such as security culture and risk perception are key notions. And whether or not 
the user has a relevant knowledge of the potential consequences of his/her actions is what partly 
determines the level of risk involved and the final security of the system. 
6.1. Recommendations 
To put things simply, humans obey least-effort rules because they are cognitive machines that 
attempt to cheaply reach flexible objectives rather than to act perfectly towards fixed targets. As a 
consequence, each time an opportunity to do so arises, efforts are avoided. This rule applies even 
to the detriment of performance or security. From our point of view, this leads to some simple 
recommendations concerning both end-users and administrators. 
• Educate staff. Education will not solve all the problems but will at least allow users to be 
aware of the consequences of their actions. Contrarily to safety at work which is regulated 
and trained for, IT security still seems to be poorly addressed (as reported in [14] and in 
[24]). This may be caused by the fact that most computers in organisations are used as 
clerical or editing tools that contain documents that are not felt to be security critical. 
However, it is a very risky assumption to believe that because one is not holding or 
processing sensitive data, attacks do not have to be cared about. Nowadays, the reality is 
that being plugged into the internet is enough to be a target. Therefore, any member of 
staff interacting with computers should be aware of the damages caused by insecure 
practices. It is far from being the case. The reason may have to do with the intangible 
nature of electronic data flows, making most of IT security problems obvious only when 
attacks have succeeded. Because of the poor visibility of insecure settings, it is necessary 
to explain to staff that e.g. email attachments can be harmful, how intrusions are 
performed and how to choose and use passwords. 
• Procedures do not rule human behaviour. Humans have an extreme ability for tweaking rules 
and procedures. Thus, IT administrators should not assume that staff members will 
follow rules to the letter. Instead, it seems more reasonable to assume that people will 
always find a way to do what they want, via a violation if needed. It does not mean that 
rules and procedures are useless. But just as obedience to the rules per se does not 
automatically increase safety at work [28], it does not increase security either. Instead, as 
Dekker [21] suggests, procedures should be seen as resources for action instead of an 
expectation about human behaviour. Procedures must be understood. Their efficiency 
relies more on the knowledge they require than on their blind acceptance. 
• Security must be user-centred [64]. Generally speaking, the design of security products and 
policies should rely more on the rules of human-computer interaction, as suggested in 
[33, 47, 53]. Also, products should be designed in such a way that users can make sense of 
their properties [37, 62]. At a finer-grained level, passwords must be, at least, easy to 
remember and reduced in number as much as possible. As far as end-users are concerned, 
the ideal number of passwords is zero. It may seem an unworkable view to security 
officers but the reason why security policies have to be enforced to humans is because 
these policies require an effort from them. And rules that are felt too costly to follow are 
simply not respected [58]. On the usability front, studies revealed holes caused by security 
products that are difficult to use [60, 61]. Therefore, any measure getting closer to an 
effortless security policy is a step forward. People should not have to remember about IT 
security or even think about it. The entire workplace should be designed according to this 
principle. User agents as described by [3] are an instance of such an approach. Also, retina 
control and fingerprints, although not a panacea, are pure effortless authentication items. 
They are both unique and virtually impossible to share with others. Purists of IT security 
will object that they can be falsified or that they may not be usable in all physical 
environments (e.g. dusty, dark places, etc.). It is true, but how good is the situation right 
now? 
• Security is not end-users’ task. How secure a system is partly depends on how high security is 
set on the scale of an organisation’s objectives. Security might be a relatively obvious goal 
for a system administrator. This it is not the case for an end-user. Solutions have to be 
thought of in order to make security transparent for whom it is not a primary objective. 
For instance, it should not be expected from staff members to report security problems, 
update virus protections or remember half a dozen passwords. These expectations are 
rarely met in the real world. Security is administrators’ task. End-users should not be 
expected to always collaborate. 
• Be aware of contradictory objectives. Asking staff to carry out their duty and spend time on 
updates and/or scanning files cannot be done at the same time and have to be traded-off 
against each other. Contradictory objectives, which are often inevitable, must be 
compensated for: security does not come first in end-users’ mind (see [54]). 
 
End-users will always have something else to do other than thinking about security. It seems to 
us that the idea of a user-centred security for end-users is a useful policy driver. Any measure going in 
this direction may improve systems’ security. 
7. LIMITS 
We have explained how, in our opinion, trade-offs between e.g. usability and security could 
impair the level of protection of a system. This surely accounts for the success of some 
intrusions. But this aspect of human functioning can be seen in a more positive way as not 
complying to the rules can also generate beneficial behaviours [12]. According to this view, 
violations are reconsidered under the angle of ad-hoc contributions to security, happening under 
exceptional circumstances and outside the frame of any clearly identified procedure. An example 
is unplugging the network cable from a connected machine when a suspicious behaviour is 
detected. It may not preclude any damage on this specific computer but it will prevent the attack 
to spread to other machines. This is the type of actions that designers probably do not expect 
users to take but that can nonetheless be implemented on-the-fly, thanks to human’s intrinsic 
flexibility. This kind of unexpected contribution to security is hardly ever addressed in computer 
security but nevertheless deserves some attention. 
Here is an angle that we have not considered in this paper. When attacks or intrusions fail, it may 
be that attackers faced problems that would have been too long to surmount given their level of 
competence, available time, or expected reward. Thus, the cognitive approach may also be fruitful 
for the study of attackers’ failures. Obviously, the major challenge here is getting the data. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Legitimate users who are not security-aware (e.g. researchers, clerical staff, managers) have other 
tasks to perform than spending their work time on securing their system. When the task of 
protecting a machine is felt to get in the way to the completion of their main tasks, users will 
probably overlook security if this allows them to ease their work. Harmful, usability-driven trade-
offs are then put in place and create holes in systems’ protections.  
Understanding where trade-offs lie can allow a better understanding of the mental processes 
involved in security practices. In the case of legitimate users, we defended the idea that security is 
impaired because it is traded-off against usability or efficiency. Now, looking at the big picture, it 
may be that past engineering experiences have something to teach us. As Leveson [40] reports, 
the introduction of high-pressure boilers aboard steamers caused a myriad of accidents. Different 
people took different positions regarding this problem. Instead of banning the new boilers, it was 
suggested that risks could be limited by adopting simple designs. This way, a more careful 
implementation of new steam engines would leave time for scientific knowledge to build up. 
Ideally, this policy would lead to a safer technological evolution, based on another strategy than 
blind trial and error. It seems to the authors that the situation in IT security today is not so 
different from what it was in the steam engines era. We are trying to prevent security breaches 
within systems that sometimes exceed our level of understanding. There is an uncountable 
number of examples of this. For instance, all major software development companies are 
continuously issuing security patches for their products. The reason is that nobody can detect all 
the flaws in a large program. Nor can anyone foresee the creativity of malicious people in 
exploiting these flaws. The consequences are that a) the arsenal of currently available protection 
tools (anti-virus software, firewalls, access control, intrusion detection systems, etc.) are no 
guarantee against attacks and b) financial losses persist [20] and [24].  
In the authors’ opinion, the way computers are used by legitimate users accounts for a number of 
security breaches. Since there is no evidence that we will step back from the pervasive use of 
information technology in the near future, understanding and compensating individual insecure 
practices is still of immense interest. Until this happens, the security challenges that our society is 
continuously facing and the financial costs involved will remind us that we have brought IT 
systems beyond end-users’ control. 
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